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I. Introduction 
 
One of the outstanding features of the recent history of legal systems is the 
growing use of scientific resources to assist in the administration of justice. In 
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Science and Technology (Portuguese Ministry of Science and Technology). 
particular, recent technological and scientific advances in genetics, such as DNA 
profiling and the production of genetic databases for forensic purposes have been 
associated with new forms of interaction between the social worlds of law and science. 
As in several other countries, genetic profiling is sometimes requested by the 
Portuguese courts, usually in serious crimes and in paternity suits. The forensic sciences 
are indeed becoming increasingly important as part of the judicial setting. They appear 
as a particularly clear-cut example of “applied science”, as the rationale for their 
constitution as a separate field of knowledge is to respond to the needs of courts of law 
through the production of evidence based on scientific procedures which is admissible 
according to legal standards.  
The intensification of this interaction, often described either as a “scientificization 
of law” or as a “judicialization of science”, has produced several impacts in diverse 
areas of society. In fact, at the same time that new scientific fields emerged or saw their 
development constrained in order to respond to the needs of the courts, new legal issues 
have raised as well as a growing body of law emphasizing the importance of scientific 
evidence within the legal process. It also transformed the way legal actors understand 
science, and raised some crucial issues regarding conceptions of rights and their 
reformulation in the areas of genetics and information. In the academic field, especially 
since the mid nineties, the social studies of science began to focus on the presence of 
genetics at courts, namely by developing a constructivist critical analysis which 
questioned the cultural authority of both law and science, henceforward seen as 
historically situated social activities. The social and academic debate on those topics, 
however, limited to the so-called adversarial judicial systems.  
In countries such as the United Kingdom or the USA, the litigation process is 
almost entirely governed, in principle, by “adversarial” procedures – that is, each part 
has the opportunity to presented to the court the material on which it relies in support of 
its case, in form of evidence and argument and to test as thoroughly as it can the 
evidence and arguments presented by the other part. Forensic scientists, legal scholars 
and social scientists have pointed out that common law systems often give raise to an 
artificial polarization of the scientific issues in disputes, encouraging expert witnesses 
to ‘take sides’ (Oddie, 1991). But the adversarial proceedings have also contributed to 
construct and reinforce the scientific credibility of various emerging technologies. As 
Sheila Jasanoff argued, in the case of DNA typing, the adversarial process was both 
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crucial and sucessfull in exposing the unacknowledged and untested assumptions 
related to this technology, but also crucial to the process of assessing its scientific and 
judicial credibility (Jasanoff, 1997). 
In Portugal, as in most “European continental judicial systems”, the rules of 
admissibility of scientific evidence and of expert witnesses are related to a distinctive 
framework associated to same particularities of the inquisitorial legal systems. In fact, 
the judge has a rather active power in trial settings – he has a central predominant role 
in the examination process and in imposing the rules of evidence and of court 
procedures. The parts can make suggestions or even present their own experts reports, 
but it is the judge who decides which evidence will be admissable in court and who 
appoints the expert witnesses. The judge is considered to be the “expert of the experts”. 
Usually, Portuguese judges’ decisions on the admissibility of expert evidence is 
coterminous with a specific ecology of practices which defines the legitimate producers 
of forensic biology and forensic medicine: a National Forensic Medicine Institute – with 
testing carried out at its three laboratories - and a Scientific Police Laboratory, both 
institutions being supervised by the Ministry of Justice. Until now, it is relatively 
uncommon that Portuguese magistrates request scientific reports to private institutions. 
They do so when public forensic laboratories aren’t able to respond to the courts 
requests due to the scarcity or inexistence of human resources. This often happens in the 
case of paternity claims. 
Another important feature concerning the presence of genetic reports in courts 
refers to the fact that some building blocks of rights as we know them in the liberal 
tradition, such as concepts of personhood, identity, privacy, physical integrity and 
parenthood, seem to have been affected by the presence of forensic science in the 
courtroom, at the same time that new rights emerged.  
Although in some core countries these issues have been at the heart of public 
debate, in Portugal, controversies concerning the performance of genetic testing and 
profiling on people and the possible risks associated with the uses of the information 
based on it seems to have been circumscribed to the worlds of law and science, and its 
resonance in the fields of regulation and policymaking has been rather limited.  
The magistrates’ perceptions of science – in this case, of genetic technologies – 
might have a crucial impact on the configuration of the impacts created by this type of 
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evidence on the administration of justice. By focusing on the Portuguese magistrates’ 
perceptions of scientific evidence, this paper aims to raise some fundamental issues 
regarding the landscape of legal systems of the inquisitorial type. Indeed, we believe 
that the magistrates’discourses and perceptions of the potential uses of scientific 
resources to assist in courts services and the impact of that evidence on judicial outputs 
can indeed be quite different according to the framing legal culture. Through its focus 
on legal practitioners' discourses, this paper examines some of the issues raised by the 
incorporation of these scientific resources in judicial activity, as a social phenomenon 
located at the intersection of law, science, politics and public policy. 
 
II. Science and law: harmony or conflict? 
 
Despite their differences in objectives, practices and traditions, science and law 
have in common their intention of exclusivity in defining reliable ways of getting at true 
versions of events. Both present themselves as the sole model of rationality and 
knowledge in the narrow field of action they are applied to. How then can the 
interaction between legal and scientific practices be understood?  
After coming into the public sphere, how is scientific knowledge influenced and 
reformulated by the social and cultural context and, more specifically, how is it 
reinterpreted and reorganized when confronted with the previous knowledge and 
experience of the legal system and of its actors? In what ways are the notions and 
scientific practices, which are to be used in a legal setting, reappropriated and 
reconstructed? What strategies do scientists develop – outside the field of so-called 
“pure science” – to produce objects of “applied science”, which have to stand up to 
evaluation by courts of law? And how are these scientific objects understood and used 
by “legal actors” (magistrates, lawyers, citizens involved in the lawsuits)? What 
transformations and reformulations are performed within the legal system in order to 
articulate or integrate scientific evidence and legal evidence in new hybrid forms of 
evidence, accountable to both science and law?  
How are the possible threats to constitutional rights arising from the use of 
scientific procedures  - such as blood tests or genetic profiling, or the use of information 
from genetic data bases - in criminal or paternity investigation recognized and dealt 
with by legal actors? What other rights or duties are created or transformed in relation 
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to the use of these scientific resources - such as the recognition of the right to refuse 
undergoing testing versus the duty of submission in the interest of justice or of third 
parties? In how far are basic notions associated with rights in the liberal tradition – like 
the notions of identity, personality, individuality, paternity, maternity, affiliation, and 
family – being transformed by the use of techniques of identification through DNA 
testing? Are the interests and rights of the different actors involved adequately protected 
and the duties of the parties engaged in legal action properly defined? Have appropriate 
procedures for the resolution of conflicts that may emerge between researchers, society 
and State been created? 
Drawing on 38 interviews to magistrates working in different Portuguese courts of 
law – twenty public prosecutors (two women and eighteen men), and eighteen judges 
(five women and thirteen men) –, we tried to identify the means used by a specific 
group of social actors to appropriate science within a particular context. Our aim was 
the sudy of a particular configuration of knowledge, in which experts in the field of law 
try to appropriate and understand scientific resources which are to be mobilized for the 
production of evidence accountable to both scientific and legal standards. The 
peculiarity of this situation lies in the way "lay" understandings of science as 
magistrates uphold them are incorporated into the expert discourse of law. The 
interviews allowed us to probe into some aspects of this process, in particular the uses 
of DNA profiling as part of the production of evidence for criminal cases and for the 
investigation of paternity claims.  
Through these interviews, we tried to address some fundamental research 
questions, such as: What did this group of actors understand as “science” and “scientific 
evidence” admissible in court? Which factors lead one individual/institution to be 
accepted as an “expert” or as a  “scientist” and others not? To what extent do legal 
actors rely on experts’ reports? Do there any particular difficulties regarding the 
magistrates’ understand of scientific reports? How do they manage to overcome these 
difficulties? Do magistrates impose their own interpretations, for example, when experts 
seem not to agree or if the scientific reports do not clearly present a straight answer to 
the questions being asked by the court or by the different parties involved? Does it 
happen very often that experts don’t agree? Do the parties usually challenge the results 
of scientific reports?  
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We also tried to understand how legal and constitutional rights could be 
constrained, threatened, and modified, enhanced or even extended as a result of the 
growing uses of scientific evidence in legal settings. In order to explore this process of 
(re) configuration of citizenship associated with changes in legal practice influenced by 
the presence of scientific reports as pieces of evidence in lawsuits, we also asked our 
interviewees to discuss some of the issues related to how individual rights could be 
affected by the use of forensic medical testing - such as physical integrity or the 
protection of the individual’s private life. The performance of forensic testing on a 
given individual, however, may be associated in a positive way with the rights of 
another individual - as is the case of blood testing or DNA profiling in paternity 
investigations. This may be regarded, on the one hand, as a threat to the physical 
integrity of the alleged father, but, on the other hand, as upholding the right of a child to 
his or her personal identity. In fact, some uses of science in legal settings have become a 
contested ground for different and potentially conflicting notions of individual rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. The legal practitioner’s discourses on scientific evidence 
 
The interviews revealed a considerable degree of homogeneity among the discourses 
of the magistrates. The aspect which seems to be in greater evidence in the relationship 
this group establishes with science is an attitude of reverence towards the latter's 
procedures and results – in fact, there is a close fitting of the results of scientific reports 
to the outcomes of lawsuits. Bearing in mind that the interviews were made in several 
courts of law and that the information obtained was recurrent, we believe that the results 
we got are not far from what we could be described as the vision of science held by 
Portuguese magistrates in general. 
According to all interviewees, of all the reports admissible in court produced by 
experts – from DNA identification reports, autopsies, evaluations of physical lesions, 
psychiatric and gynecological examinations (those usually performed at the forensic 
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laboratories supervised by the Portuguese Ministry of Justice) to economic and 
accounting reports – the ones that enjoy greater credibility are those produced in State 
laboratories. Generally speaking, the practices that occur within the context of a 
laboratory are understood as peculiar actions, subtracted from the contingencies of 
everyday life and of the "external" world and thus highly reliable. Furthermore, as 
elements of evidence they are extremely welcome in court, because they are seen as a 
tool that allows the discipline of law in its struggle for standards of objectivity, 
neutrality and exactness that would otherwise – through the use of testimonial evidence 
or the judge’s “intuition” or  “common sense”, as well as “good courtroom practice” – 
be unattainable. 
This vision of the specific physical space - the laboratory - and of the scientists 
who work in it as self-regulated, separated from the “common world”, has become clear 
as we questioned the magistrates on whether they worried about the possibility of 
laboratories coming up with false results or that, in the context of a criminal 
investigation, there might be problems with the collection of samples which could 
distort the results. Every magistrate, without exception, answered that he/she did not 
think about that. The possibility of laboratory error seemed quite remote and even odd 
for two main reasons: firstly, because the results of scientific tests admitted in court are 
carried out by personnel considered extremely competent because they work for the 
National Forensic Medicine Institute. If the tests were carried out in private laboratories 
– considered less trustworthy, since they are not backed by official organizations – there 
could be doubts about the results. Secondly, the work done in a laboratory is seen as an 
extremely precise activity, its results being based on the use of highly accurate physical 
instruments, like microscopes, and of materials like test-tubes, objects which are 
ellegedly free from possible distortions due to subjectivity or personal opinion. The 
scientist is thus seen as a subject - a human being with all his or her weaknesses and 
biases - which is likely to make mistakes unless (s) he is backed by laboratory 
instruments which endow him/her with almost supernatural powers: the mediation of 
the scientific tool is thus a crucial element in achieving “factual truth”. 
As to the possibility of errors occurring when collecting or preserving samples to 
be analyzed in a laboratory, the magistrates showed some surprise at the query itself, as 
if such a thing could never happen. They stated that that was a subject they never 
worried about, as they trusted the professional capacity of the police forces who 
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collected the materials for analysis and testing. Besides, if, at any time, there were a 
problem with the samples, it would probably be detected by the scientists, who would 
certainly mention it in the reports presented in court – though none of the interviewees 
knew of any such situation. According to them, the worst scenario case was that of the 
reports sometimes stating that there was not enough quantity of material for the forensic 
scientists to be able to reach any conclusions. Never did they question the quality of the 
material. 
All in all, the magistrates’ trust in the technical capacities of the scientists who 
work in laboratories supervised by the Ministry of Justice seems to be absolutely 
unshakeable. As far as DNA profiling is concerned, all the magistrates stated that they 
truly believed in that scientific tool, based on the assumption that “DNA is unique and 
non-repetitive in each individual” and that “genetics is an extremely advanced and exact 
science “. 
Genetics is seen by the interviewees as an extremely complex science, its 
understanding wrapped in a number of myths, such as the notion that, somehow, the 
scientific analysis of the genes will be able unravel our most deeply hidden secrets (like 
inwards tendencies, potential behaviour and pathologies), and the belief that the field of 
genetics is somehow characterized by a high degree of mathematical exactness which 
endows its statements, in turn, with a high degree of certainty (Derksen, 2000; Smith et 
al., 2000). 
In contrast to this trust in genetic testing and profiling, magistrates seem to have 
doubts about the capacity of other disciplines or fields of expertise, like, for instance, 
psychiatry, to “find out the truth”. Interviewees stated that in the latter field the expert’s 
subjectivity was likely to affect his/her analysis. In their opinion, mistakes may happen, 
due to the fact that the psychiatrist does not have material tools that would allow him 
absolute exactness (as would happen, for example, if they had something like a 
microscope). The psychiatrist has to rely on the ability to observe with a “naked eye”, 
which means that the observed can “make a performance” so as to distort the results of 
the examination. The magistrates pointed out, however, that the psychiatric reports do 
have considerable weight in judicial ruling, because, as many interviewees stated, after 
all, they are medical doctors, so their conclusions are based on scientific knowledge. 
 From the early 1990's on, the use of genetic profiling has become common in 
cases of paternity investigation in Portuguese courts. They are more sparsely used in 
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criminal investigations, though. According to magistrates, the use of genetic profiling 
revolutionized the legal investigation of paternity, which was previously limited to 
testimonial evidence, documentation and blood testing.  When confronted with the issue 
of the validity of “traditional” evidence (testimonial), every interviewee underlined its 
“fallibility”, as witnesses present their opinions and personal experiences (which are 
understood as subjective, ambivalent or even “false”), and may even be manipulated to 
alter the account of events so that the party they represent in the process is favoured. In 
contrast, scientific evidence is regarded as a reliable representation of the “truth of 
fact”, being “neutral”, and as such, indispensable to the discovery of “biological truth”. 
In other words, as mentioned before, legal decisions in lawsuits on investigations of 
paternity are almost exclusively based on results of DNA profiling. 
The biggest obstacle to the full use of DNA paternity typing by courts is the 
frequent refusal of the presumed father to be subject to it, as it implies drawing blood 
for analysis. It is the magistrate’s belief that they can indeed refuse the blood tests, 
because that medical action can be seen as a violation of their constitutional right to 
physical integrity. Confronted with the question of whether the courts then ask the 
laboratories to collect other type of biological material for DNA analysis – saliva, 
pieces of fingernails, or hair (that action possibly being perceived as less “intrusive” 
than blood collecting) – only one magistrate answered affirmatively. This public 
prosecutor is an exception among the magistrates, and is even well known among his 
colleagues for his unorthodox positions. Some of the magistrates confessed they did not 
know of this technical possibility, whereas some others stated that these were probably 
very expensive exams (although they did not know how much they cost). The 
interviewees displayed a limited knowledge of the scientific techniques usable for legal 
purposes and, more importantly, a great reluctance in altering routine practices. 
Though the reverent attitude of the legal world towards scientific evidence based 
on DNA typing is clear, it is also clear that legal actors try to reconcile testimonial 
evidence (seen as a rather fallible kind of evidence) and scientific evidence in their 
practice, as a means to uphold the boundaries between the methods and the practices 
specific to the worlds of law and of science. In this process of construction and flexible 
and casual negotiation of boundaries, the magistrates’ reverent attitude towards science 
is maintained, but the legal setting for the presentation and evaluation of scientific 
evidence allows the continuity of the rituals and the rhetoric traditionally present in 
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trials. That is, although the magistrates believe that scientific evidence – more 
specifically, genetic profiles – is the deciding factor in the lawsuit, they consider it 
necessary to keep on calling for witnesses in order to preserve the specificity of the 
legal apparatus. 
The magistrates were also asked if they experienced any difficulty in 
communicating with the experts or understanding the scientific reports. Although most 
interviewees admitted to a certain difficulty in understanding some reports – especially 
psychiatric and economic ones – they believed that any such difficulties can be easily 
overcome, either because the jurists accumulate experience in the field of judicial 
practice, or because there is an agreement of sorts among the magistrates: the results of 
scientific reports are to be accepted without question.  Some of them said they asked for 
some informal help, from friends – medical doctors or economists, for example. There 
seems to be little direct contact between magistrates and scientists. 
Not only the magistrates but also lawyers, witnesses and other social actors 
involved in lawsuits seem to show reverence towards scientific evidence. In fact, 
contrary to what happens, for instance, in the U. S. A., there is little or no tradition of 
openly challenging evidence in the courtroom. There is only one area in which this 
routinely happen – economic reports. The interviewees as being based on two main 
factors explain this phenomenon: first, economic science is not as exact as the 
laboratory sciences for example, because the expert does not have the tools to get to 
"absolute truth". Secondly, and in so far as huge amounts of money may be at stake in 
the lawsuit, there is always pressure from private interests that can distort the experts’ 
performances and lead to divergent results. 
This quasi-total lack of opposition by the different parts to scientific reports 
presented by experts nominated by the court is nonetheless surprising. Maybe some 
explanations can be found if we think that in the majority of lawsuits, the population 
involved belongs to less well off social classes – both economically and culturally. 
According to studies on access to justice, class greatly affects the capacity for litigation 
within the judicial system. The higher propensity towards challenging scientific 
evidence in economic lawsuits may be linked to the fact that it generally involves 
people with great economic power (usually more willing and financially able to 
challenge the courts' or other parties' experts). Thus, and not unexpectedly, we may say 
that the use of science in courts can be conditioned by extra-judicial factors. 
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Before deciding on a sentence, magistrates frequently request reports based on 
social inquiries on the character, personality and social and domestic background of the 
accused (in criminal cases) and of the minor's mother in paternity claims (a social 
inquiry on the alleged father is not requested, though). Bearing that in mind, we also 
asked the magistrates about their perception of social workers' skills and functions. In 
particular, we tried to find out whether magistrates perceived social workers as 
“experts” or as “scientists”. 
All interviewees answered that they thought of social workers not as scientists or 
“true experts”, but neither were they described as “laypeople”. As one magistrate said, 
They are on the border between science and common sense. You see, they have an 
academic degree, but they don’t use any rigorous methodology to reach their results. 
You can’t find any mathematical or statistical models in their reports. Their statements 
are based in their own opinions based on what they can observe and hear from the 
neighbours of the people involved. Everything is quite subjective... 
 “And so, do social reports help you in making decisions?” we asked. “It is 
another piece of evidence. Of course I believe more in statements by social technicians 
than in witnesses, who tend to lie a lot! But, of course, I don’t think that social inquiries 
are as trustworthy as genetic tests, for instance! 
This extract of one interview points towards some factors that lead some 
individuals/institutions to be considered as “experts” or “scientists” and other not. One 
of those factors is related to the kinds of instruments used by the individuals to analyze 
empirical reality and to produce results. As we pointed out before, the use of physical 
instruments that are perceived as “exclusively used by scientists” – such as microscopes 
or test tubes – is highly valuated. On the contrary, the use of individuals’ own senses 
(like the “naked eye”) is evaluated as basically similar to common sense, and then 
devaluated. But how to explain, then, the difference between magistrates’ evaluation of 
the psychiatrists' and social technicians’ reports? The classification of the psychiatrists 
as “scientists, after all” despite the fact that subjectivity can distort their analyzes and 
the denial of that status to social technicians reaffirms social hierarchies and power 
structures existing in society. Gender distinctions also pervade that difference of 
evaluation of psychiatrists and the social technicians, since common sense perceives the 
former as being usually male (and therefore, capable of being rational and objective) 
and the latter as female (and, therefore, more liable to irrationality and subjectivity).  
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 IV. Law/Science and citizenship 
 
The use of science in the public sphere – in the case at hand the courts of law -, 
namely the identification through DNA profiling in criminal investigations and in 
paternity or maternity claims, has lead to intense legal debate on the issue of citizens’ 
rights concerning the performance of scientific testing on human beings. Several 
questions have triggered the debate in some countries. In Portugal, the public debate has 
been circumscribed (Costa, 2000), basically limiting itself to the legal field and, in part, 
to the scientific field. Some discussion is being promoted of general ethic and legal 
problems associated with the obligation to comply and to the refusal to submit to testing 
or profiling. These questions are being turned into fundamental issues for the 
construction of the future of citizenship, of the State and society’s acceptance of 
responsibility for the paths taken by the scientific research in areas that can endanger 
the fundamental rights of the citizens. 
One of the issues most discussed by legal scholars concerning the use of scientific 
testing on people in legal investigations has to do with the legal construction of the 
human body and the division established between “strictly personal” parts and products 
of the body – like blood – and “non-strictly personal” parts of the body – hair, 
fingernails and saliva (Oliveira, 1999). 
Portuguese jurisprudence has been divided in the discussion about the legitimacy 
of imposing compulsory blood tests on investigations of paternity. One party defends 
that the refusal to submit to a blood test is legitimate, as it can be seen as an action that 
offends the fundamental right to physical integrity and to the protection of private life. 
The other party – the dominant one – considers this refusal illegitimate, though forceful 
submission to the examination is illegal. To impose the examinations by means of 
physical coercion would be a direct violation of physical integrity. 
While the presumed fathers’ refusal to undergo blood tests for DNA identification 
is benevolently accepted by the magistrates we interviewed (“He has that right, you 
know? He may have an absolute terror of needles or for religious reasons he may 
oppose the taking of blood samples ”), the same does not happen where criminal 
investigations are concerned. In a crime situation, the interviewees state that although 
the constitutional principle being discussed can still be raised, they know of no suspects 
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that refused to undergo the medical examination. Apparently, the refusal to collaborate 
in an investigation of paternity is “less serious” than in that of a crime, despite the fact 
that the defence of rights other than those of the defendant guaranteed by the 
constitution is at stake in both cases: in an investigation of paternity, the right to the 
child’s personal identity and to its own genetic information; in a crime, the victims’ 
rights. 
The clash of fundamental rights raised by the issue of subjecting people to 
medical examinations, mirrors, through the practice of courts of law, the powers and 
hierarchies previously existing in society. That is very clear when we get to the gender 
distinctions that are upheld in the case of investigations of paternity. The Portuguese 
State aims at investigating a child’s paternity in two ways: by asking the mother of the 
minor about her sexual partners in the period of conception of the child and by 
performing genetic examinations of the child, the mother and the presumed father. 
The questions asked the mother (even is she does not wish to tell who the child’s 
father is) about her sexual life may be seen as a threat to her constitutional right to 
privacy. However, in the interviewees’ opinion, in this situation of conflict between the 
rights of the child and those of the mother, the child’s rights must prevail. The 
legitimacy of this authoritarian relationship between the State and the women is 
ideologically justified with the argument that the minor’s essential rights – namely 
his/her constitutional right to personal identity and to access his/her own genetic 
information - are being defended. These are understood as closely related to a hyper-
valorization of the function of the genes in the construction of the personal and social 
identity of the individual, in so far as the determination of biological ascendancy (for 
psychological, medical and financial reasons) of a child whose paternity is not legally 
determined is seen as a means to safeguard some of his/her constitutional rights. 
Now, in so far as the presumed father’s refusal to undergo a blood test is 
concerned, the magistrates believe that the individuals right to physical integrity should 
prevail before the minor’s rights. When, during the interviews, we confronted the 
magistrates with this discrepancy between the judicial defence of the mothers’ rights 
and those of the alleged fathers, almost all of them showed some discomfort with the 
issue being raised.  
Thus, we can state that the use of science in the courts is mediated by a patriarchal 
ideology, one that reaffirms the power of men over women. This is also visible in the 
 13
fact that in the cases of investigation of paternity in which there is suspicion of 
prostitution on the part of the child’s mother the court does not order a laboratory test, 
even if the mother indicates a presumed father. The obstacles raised to DNA paternity 
typing in the cases of prostitute mothers show a situation of inequality in the access to 
justice, sanctioned by the use given to science in the courts. 
Besides the usual problems caused by the judicial imposition of exams on people, 
the study of DNA profiles raises other worries that have been underlined by legal 
doctrine, be it Portuguese or international, and that are related to the risk that these 
exams could be used to supply personal characteristics of genetic expression, which 
could be used institutionally or otherwise, beyond the identification of the examinee – 
information that is already provided by the traditional fingerprint databases (Oliveira, 
1999).  If databases with genetic information become easily available to official entities 
it would be tempting indeed to begin to systematically collect the DNA of every citizen 
or group of citizens predefined in some way (age, ethic group, sex) with the objective – 
either explicit or not – of intentionally broadening the research beyond the investigation 
needs established by the law. The magistrates were questioned on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the use of a genetic database for criminal investigations. A significant 
percentage of them did not know of the possibility of using genetic profiles for the 
identification of criminals and none of them knew of any case in which this technique 
was used to identify crime suspects. The majority of the interviewees pointed out the 
danger of using this kind of information otherwise than in a criminal investigation and, 
in general, were suspicious of and unreceptive to this technique. This leads to the 
conclusion that the legal system is extremely conservative and that only after a certain 
scientific technique begins being used in several courtrooms is it accepted without 
reservations. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Accepting the conclusions and the paths open by the more recent developments of 
the social studies of science, we understand that the meeting of forensic medicine with 
the judicial system creates “trading zones” and boundary areas where the different fields 
of knowledge and practice – of science and of the legal system  - meet and transform 
each other through the definition of concepts and statutes, of roles and competences 
needed in order to function in those hybrid spaces and that allow for the resurgence of a 
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platform where sharing and co-operation is possible among the actors embedded in very 
different contexts and related in different ways to the understanding and use of 
scientific procedures. (Nunes, 2000: 82; Galison, 1996). 
The increasing presence of results of genetic profiling for individual identification 
in lawsuits taken to court has led to further reflection by the social scientists (Jasanoff, 
1997; Lynch, 1998) and has created the urgent need to discuss some of the current 
institutional uses of genetic information. In our perspective, the Portuguese legal system 
is in itself an area of social interaction in which not only some specific traits of the 
process of understanding and public use of science can be perceived with a certain 
clarity, but also the open possibilities for institutional and political control of the 
individual based on biological categorising can be followed. 
We also have to consider some specific traits being raised by the presence of 
genetic technologies in the Portuguese courts. In fact, the specificity of the judge’s role 
in the so-called inquisitorial judicial systems outstands how genetic expert reports are 
perceived by the magistrates as a type of evidence that is indeed on the track of absolute 
truth, or at least, as constituting all that is worth knowing in trial. Traditionally, law was 
perceived both by jurists and by social scientists and philosophers as not being 
concerned solely with factual truth in the scientific sense (i.e., as the binary oppositions 
between  “wrong”/”right” and “false”/”true” reveal). In fact, the dependence on the 
legal and legitimacy and accuracy of the ways of producing evidence admissable in 
court and other institutional and formal requirements, as well as on the society’s larger 
concerns has been seen as a specific feature of the judicial world. The presence of 
genetic resources in everyday use in the administration of justice and the almost 
absolute reverence of the portuguese magistrates to that kind of scientific reports, can 
deeply change that panorama, reinforcing the legal actors submission to the ‘wonderful’ 
world of science. This problem is particularly relevant to inquisitorial judicial systems. 
In fact, unlike the adversarial legal systems, that relies on the clash of opposing 
viewpoints before a relatively passive tribunal that then adjucates, the Portuguese 
magistrates actively inquire the parties in to the “factual truth”. Some authors stand that 
the latter judicial systems are more dependent on expert reports, perceived as the 
‘rational way of going about things’, whereas the former seems to have little to 
commend it (Oddie, 1991) Still, as we have pointed that, the effective application of 
genetic evidence both in criminal as in civil cases, is strickly and criteriously controlled 
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by the magistrates, according to their own subjective system of values that will define 
which are the cases that are worthy or not to aceed to that kind of evidence.   
The ideological enfolding of the courts uses of genetic information emphasizes 
the practical utility and large public benefits. However, the perception of the possible 
risks associated to this kind of systematic hoarding of genetic data made possible by the 
scientific research in the field of genetics triggered a legal debate on the danger of 
violation of the fundamental values of democracy, the safety of citizens and the respect 
for freedom and the exercise of fundamental rights constitutionally guaranteed. The 
problem is that this discussion was not brought to the public in a dynamic, visible way, 
as it was done in other countries. 
All in all, we are facing a scientific information deficit panorama as far as the 
actors of the judicial system are concerned (the majority of the interviewees never had 
any training in the sciences, not any information other than that received during their 
university years and in the training courses for magistrates). Besides, any dialogue 
between scientists, magistrates and citizens is quite limited. Bearing all this in mind, it 
is foreseeable that there will be many obstacles in Portugal to a wide public discussion 
on the molecular genetic techniques and their uses, on how to regulate them and on the 
potential threats their unregulated use may bring to the citizens.  
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